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INTRODUCTION 
This regional input considers recent developments and future prospects of fiscal policy (part 
I) and monetary policy (part II) of Benelux, France and Germany (EMU-5) covering the 
period of 1997-2004. The survey on fiscal policy is structured as follows: After addressing the 
issue of sustainable budget policy, main characteristics in the five countries are surveyed. In 
doing so, the emphasis is on, firstly, budgetary deficit and public debt dynamics; secondly, on 
structural issues in particular the rising problem of ageing populations; thirdly, on recently 
adopted fiscal reforms. After that empirical overview the role of political cycles is surveyed. 
Finally, the possible impact of the enlargement process on the European institutional setting 
for fiscal policy-making is discussed. Part II on monetary policy deals with the following 
issues: After a short survey is given concerning the theoretical framework, the possibly 
existing heterogeneity is explored by investigating national diversity among EMU-5. Thereby, 
the focus will be on two of the most important economic dispersion factors, namely the 
synchronisation of business cycles of EMU-5 and the development of inflation rates. 
 
PART I: FISCAL POLICY 
By the early 1990s the problem of unsustainable budget deficits had been widely recognised. 
Following the recession in the aftermath of Germany's reunification and the EMS-crises in 
the early 1990s, fiscal positions improved significantly. When consolidation became a priority 
within Europe, these efforts were even intensified by the run-up to European Monetary 
Union (EMU). The simultaneously required compliance with the Maastricht-criteria, enforced 
strict budgetary consolidation in 1993-1997. The creation of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) in 1997 committed national governments to aim at medium-term budgetary balance 
beyond the original convergence process of Maastricht. 
Regarding this institutional setting, all five countries have made progress in fiscal 
consolidation improving their financial and primary balances in actual terms during 1997-
2000 (see tables 1, 2, figures 1, 2). The progress, though, in cyclically-adjusted terms has been 
lower (see tables 3, 4, figures 3, 4). Furthermore, in all countries the gross public debt could 
be reduced as government net debt interest payments and gross and net financial liabilities 
decreased (see tables 5-7, 9 figures 5-7, 9). The achievements in controlling adverse public 
debt dynamics can partly be seen in the context of considerable progress made over the past 
two decades. However, concerns regarding fiscal sustainability have re-emerged in recent 
years. Fiscal positions seemed to have worsened in some countries mostly due to increases in 
total outlays (see table 8, figure 8). Moreover, with regard to the development of public debt,   5 
France and Germany appear to loose track of fiscal consolidation (see table 9 and figure 9). 
Regarding the nearer future of the latter, the prospects are not that very optimistic. We will 
return to these prospects after reviewing the fiscal policy formation in the considered 
countries here. 
 
1.  Current and medium-term prospects of fiscal positions of Benelux, France and 
Germany 
1.1. Budgetary deficits and public debt dynamics (1997-2004) 
 
Belgium 
Since the government introduced the Convergence Plan in 1992 to formalise the goal of 
meeting the Maastricht criteria, Belgian fiscal consolidation has been more regular. From 
1997 to 2001, the budgetary position improved sharply and faster than in the Euro-area on 
average. The general governments financial balance moved from a deficit of 2 per cent in 
1997 to a small surplus of 0.4 per cent in 2001 (see table 1) particularly in course of a 
reduction of governmental interest payments and total outlays (see tables 5, 8, figures 5, 8). 
An economic outlook predicts a deterioration in the next two years towards a balanced 
budget, before rising again to a slight surplus of 0.5 per cent of GDP in 2004 (see table 1). 
Furthermore, there is the gross public debt-rate, that is very high – compared with the Euro-
area level, although shrinking steadily from over 120 per cent of GDP in 1997 to about 108 
per cent in 2001 (see table 9). It is projected to further decrease to 97.3 per cent in 2004. 
 
France 
Similarly to Belgium, French public finances have undergone an intensive process of fiscal 
consolidation since the mid-1990s. The general governmental deficit was reduced from 3 per 
cent of GDP in 1997 to 1.4 per cent in 2001 (see table 1) whereas the level of taxes slightly 
increased (see table 10, figure 10). However, the initially envisaged budget deficit of 1.5 per 
cent of GDP in 2002 has not been achieved. A growth rate lower than projected, a decrease 
in non-tax revenues and a rise in social security spending deteriorated the budget deficit to an 
estimated 2.7 per cent of GDP in 2002 (see table 1). The OECD projected that the deficit will 
stabilise at about 2.5 per cent until 2004 (see table 1). At present, the excessive expenditures 
of the French government is a main concern. In this context, it is alluded to the public debt 
dynamics in France which may exceed the 60 per cent-threshold in 2004 (see table 9).   6 
According to the IMF, however, the gross debt may keep in line with the Maastricht criterion 
until 2004 (see table 11). 
  
Germany 
Fiscal consolidation is a key priority in Germany, too. As a result, the general governments 
financial balances could be turned – mainly through a reduction of general government 
outlays (see table 8) – from a deficit of 2.7 of GDP in 1997 to a surplus of 1.1 per cent of 
GDP in 2000 (see table 1). During the same period the primary balance rose sharply from 0.5 
per cent of GDP to 4.1 per cent (see table 2) and the gross public debt decreased to 60.2 per 
cent of GDP (see table 9). However, since consecutive tax reductions (see below) were not 
backed by equivalent cuts in governmental spending, the specific 3 per cent-limit has been 
apparently exceeded in 2002. In course of lagging growth combined with unexpected 
additional expenses, for instance, on defence and security measures in course of 9/11 and the 
financing of recovery after the flood last summer
1, the deficit arrived at 3.7 per cent of GDP 




The Netherlands attained a remarkable progress in fiscal consolidation during 1997-2000. 
Both the deficit in the financial budget balance and that of the cyclically-adjusted general 
balance have been turned into surpluses between 1997 and 2000 (see tables 1 and 3). 
Moreover the gross public debt could steadily be reduced to lower than that of the EU-
average level of 55.8 per cent of GDP in 2000. In this respect, unexpected economic growth 
rates and revenue windfalls are a key factor in the Dutch medium-term orientated budgetary 
framework, aiming at sustainable budget dynamics (see below). Nevertheless, since 2001, the 
process of fiscal consolidation has been flagging due to an economic slowdown. Even if net 
debt payments and the percentage of gross public debt will further decline (see tables 5, 9, 
figures 5, 9), the projections are less optimistic. The financial balance is expected to turn into 
a deficit of 0.8 per cent of GDP in 2002 and recover only slightly to 0.3 per cent of GDP in 
2004 (see table 1). 
 
                                                            
1 Due to the damages caused by the flood, a “reconstruction fund” totalling € 7.1 billion was constructed, 
financed by the federal government and the states (so-called Laender).   7 
Luxembourg 
Luxembourg is a prig within the EMU regarding the gross public debt remaining stable at 
about 6 per cent since 1997 (see table 9). The Coalition Agreement of 1999 implemented 
fiscal sustainability by announcing three main principles of public finance (see below). In 
comparison to other European countries, Luxembourg’s fiscal policy formation has been 
rather convenient over the last two decades. During 1997-2001 the budget surplus rose from 
2.8 to 6.1 per cent of GDP (see table 1). Last year, this surplus shrunk to 1.8 per cent of GDP 
due to sizeable tax cuts. Moreover, for this reason, OECD projects a further decrease to 0.5 
per cent GDP in 2004 (see table 1). In this context, the OECD predicts an increase of 
governmental total outlays from 38.6 per cent in 2001 to about 44 per cent of GDP in 2004 
(see table 8). Nevertheless, medium term prospects are quite comfortable. 
 
1.1  Ageing population and health care 
The rising costs of an ageing population cause severe problems which the countries surveyed 
here have to cope with. Prospective boosts in public health expenditure (see tables 12, 13) are 
attributed to increasing life expectancy (see tables 14, 15) and technological advances in 
health-care systems. Corresponding low mortality rates (see tables 16, 17) accompanied low 
fertility (see table 18) contribute to a constant growth of the elderly (see table 19), also 
expressed by the old-age dependency ratio (see table 20, figure 11). Public pension systems 
will be charged on this account (see table 21 and figure 12). In this context, specific problems 
of the considered countries are surveyed.  
 
Belgium 
Ageing population is a serious concern in Belgium. The respective old-age dependency ratio
2 
is expected to increase from the current 28 per cent to 50 per cent in 2050 (see table 20). A 
main factor of this considerable rise is the increasing life expectancy over the next 5 decades 
(see table 14). As a result, pension expenditure is projected to increment from 10 per cent 
(2000) to 13.3 per cent in 2050, which is compared with France, Germany and The 
Netherlands a relatively modest rise (see table 21). That effect can be traced back to the 
declining transfer ratio
3 (see table 22). In Belgium the transfer ratio has declined since 1990, 
                                                            
2 In contrast to the OECD definition, the Belgian Federal Planning Bureau (FPB) defines old-age dependency 
ratio as ([60 +]/ 20-59-years old). That is why the current level of old-age dependency ratio - according to FPB – 
amounts to 40 per cent, projecting an increase to 60 per cent in 2050.  
3 The transfer ratio is defined as: ([ratio of average pension per beneficiary]/[average GDP per worker]).   8 
mainly because pensions are indexed to prices, not wages and because of the past pension 
reforms (see IMF. 2003). 
Even though new control mechanisms have recently been introduced, cost pressure from 
technological advances and those of an ageing population are likely to increase. According to 
specific projections based by the Belgian Federal Planning Bureau (FPB)
4 it is expected that 
health-care expenditures will rise by 3.1 per cent between 2000-2050 (see table 22). Overall, 
the fiscal costs of ageing are projected to increase as from today by 4.1 percentage points to 
26.3 per cent of GDP in 2050 (see table 22). The risk of unsustainable pension financing may 
seem low at the moment as large primary surpluses have been built up over the past years. 




The ageing population will significantly influence the long-term prospects for economic 
growth and the governmental budget in France, most notably as the old-age dependency ratio 
will nearly double from 26 per cent in 2000 to 53 per cent in 2050 (see table 20). Pension 
expenditures will probably rise from 12.1 per cent of GDP in 2000 to 15.8 per cent in 2040 
(see table 21). A further aspect is the relatively expensive health system, for which nearly 10 
per cent of GDP is allocated (see table 13). The Ageing Group of ECOFIN (AWG)
5 
calculated that, including health and long-term care, the rise amounts to even 5.3. percentage 
points of GDP (IMF. 2002d). However, in this respect it has to be considered that the AWG 
assumes non-age related expenditure to be growing at the growth rate of GDP, which is 
probably an optimistic assumption compared to recent historical experience (see IMF. 2002d: 
9). In order to analyse long-term effects of an ageing population, the IMF calculated two 
specific scenarios (see IMF. 2002d: 9). In a baseline scenario (policies left unchanged)
6, the 
unsustainable development becomes apparent: After a short initial improvement of the fiscal 
balance, ageing and debt expenditure will constantly increase the deficit from 2 per cent of 
GDP in 2002 to about 12 per cent of GDP in 2050, aggravating the debt from about 60 per 
cent in 2002 to 200 per cent of GDP in 2050 (IMF. 2002d: 9). In a second sustainable 
scenario, taking into account savings from pension reform, the structural fiscal balance will 
                                                            
4 It is inter alia assumed that the employment rate will increase during the next five decades. These assumptions 
would imply significant structural reforms, particularly a pension reform reducing incentives for early retirement 
(see IMF. 2003: 23sqq). 
5 The projections of AWG are summarised in: IMF. 2002d: 9.   
6 The specific assumptions are listed in: IMF. 2002d: 9.   9 
register small surplus during 2006-2016 and will probably decrease to a level of around 0.75 
per cent of GDP in the long-run. At the same time, the debt ratio remains at about 27 per 
cent of GDP in 2050 (IMF. 2002d: 9). 
Discerning the ageing problems, the French administration has set a mid-2003 deadline for a 
pension reform. A structural reform might greatly contribute to achieving the necessary fiscal 
consolidation in case public spending does not rise rapidly and revenues from higher growth 
are rather used to accumulate budgetary surpluses. 
 
Germany 
Improving fiscal sustainability of the public pay-as-you-go system (PAYG) is a key issue in 
Germany. The projected rapid increase in the amount of old people in the population to 53 
per cent in 2050 (see table 20) will aggravate the already existing problems of the benefit-
related insurance system: According to IMF staff projections the total costs of age-related 
government spending will further increase by 6.7 per cent of GDP in 2050 (see table 23). At 
the outset of the now ruling government, the socialdemocratic-green administration 
introduced an energy tax for re-financing a cut in non-wage labour costs for PAYG in 1999. 
Then, in January 2002, the German administration adopted a pension reform, i.e. the so-
called  Riester-Rente
7. This is a private funded system based on a voluntary principle and 
publicly co-financed. Though initially considered as a second pillar and a fundamental change 
in the German pension system, this reform entailed no significant effects on private savings 
so far.  
Concerning the long-term horizon, further reforms seem essential. The reforms required do 
not have to be drastic, but need to cover all dimensions of welfare spending and should be 
implemented early (IMF. 2002c). The IMF suggests that the specific reforms should not 
necessarily infringe the provisions of the SGP (see table 24)
8. 
Another problem is the expensive health-care system, that accounts for 10.3 per cent of GDP 
in 1998, representing the highest level of the five countries (see table 13). The rise in spending 
contributed to a significant increase in non-wage labour costs over the last decade. 
Accordingly, Germany is also the country with the highest level of health expenditure per 
capita (see table 12). Consequently, new health reform measures came into effect in January 
2000 (Gesundheitsreform 2000) keeping contribution rates stable. Specific measures comprised, 
                                                            
7 The share of private pension fund assets was only 5.8 per cent in 1996 (see table 25). 
8 The IMF assumed that the generosity of pensions, unemployment, and health programs are reduced; future 
retirement ages are raised and the length of education periods is cut down (see IMF. 2002c).    10
for instance, that spending by hospitals and physicians are subject to budget limits. In 
addition, a list of reimbursable pharmaceuticals has been developed to support spending 
restraint. However, some of these measures have already been reversed. At present, the re-
elected government has set further reform on agenda. 
 
Luxembourg 
In Luxembourg the old-age dependency ratio will nearly double from 23 per cent in 2000 to a 
level of 42 per cent in 2050 (see table 20). To be prepared for these challenges, the 
government adopted a pension reform in April 2002. As a main result, private pension 
benefits will be increased to an estimated annual fiscal costs of about 0.7 percentage point of 
GDP (IMF. 2002a: 12). Nevertheless, Luxembourg’s generous PAYG-scheme might cause 
trouble in the long run. The IMF has calculated three alternative scenarios to study the effects 
of ageing population (see IMF. 2002a: 12). Given a baseline scenario
9 the contribution rate 
will probably increase after having implemented the reform to 23.4 per cent of labour 
income. Then the level of contributions will stabilise by 2030. Until 2050, the level will 
constantly decline to about 21 per cent of labour income. In contrast, in an according average 
growth scenario
10 a sharp rise of the contribution rate to 46.4 per cent by 2040 is expected. 
That increase might emerge in course of flagging growth and more additional spending due to 
the ageing population. Under the third scenario (ILO scenario)
11 the rise of the contribution 
rate is limited to 29.3 per cent in 2030 before declining steadily to around 27 per cent in 2050. 
Consequently, as the growth rates are likely to lie between the average growth scenario and 
the ILO in the long run, Luxembourg’s pension system will be confronted with increasing 
contribution rates that will not be stopped by the current pension reform (IMF. 2002a).  
 
The Netherlands 
The Netherlands’ population is rapidly ageing, too. The number of people aged 65 and over 
will double between 2010 and 2030 (Carey, 2002: 5). As a result, economic growth will be 
reduced and resource transfers to elderly (i.e., on account for both pensions and health care) 
will be increased: The Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Ageing (CPB) projects that 
                                                            
9 Concerning the status quo scenario it is assumed that the real GDP growths are annually by 5 per cent, the 
employment increases by 3 per cent and the ratio of cross-border workers to resident workers to 6 per cent by 
2050. 
10 The average growth scenario assumes the status quo until 2005 and no cross-border inflows thereafter, 
implying average GDP growth of 2.1 per year. 
11 The ILO scenario resembles the status-quo scenario but with 2 per cent employment growth and 4 per cent 
annual GDP growth.   11
public expenditure on pensions and health care will probably rise by 8.75 percentage points of 
GDP between now and 2040 (see table 26). Nevertheless, The Netherlands are better 
positioned than the other countries, as its relatively balanced population structure implies a 
small ageing shock
12. Its debt-GDP ratio is with 50 per cent of GDP in 2001 below the EU 
average (see table 9), and the pension system is better diversified as it includes a large and well 
funded second pillar (see table 25). The Netherlands has by far the largest amount of private 
pension fund assets in EU countries: Assets of the Dutch pension funds increased to 121 per 
cent of GDP in 2001 and are expected to amount to nearly 200 per cent of GDP by 2040 
(IMF. 2002b: 7). 
The CPB produced two scenarios
13 calculating a deficit path that would ensure long-term 
fiscal sustainability without increases in taxes or security contributions. In short, the CPB 
suggests to finance additional costs by eliminating the national debt by 2025. Under the first 
baseline scenario leaving policies unchanged, the government debt will be reduced from 54 
per cent of GDP in 2001 to 28 per cent in 2020 before increasing significantly (see table 26). 
Regarding this, the CPB concludes that even in the base case, public debt is reduced 
substantially over the next thirty years so that public finances appear sustainable during this 
period. However, after 2030 the budget deficit could exceed the Maastricht criterion and the 
debt path becomes explosive after 2040 (see IMF 2002b: 8). In contrast, a second scenario – 
calculating with preventive tax raises to account for prospective costs of ageing population – 
is characterised by an initial decline of the government debt, remaining constant between 8-13 
per cent of GDP thereafter (see table 26). As a result, the national debt would be eliminated 
in 2025 and the budget nearly balanced in 2040 (IMF 2002b: 8). Furthermore the CPB 
projects that due to the expected increase in life expectancy (see table 14, 15) public 
expenditures on health care, pensions and disability could rise by nearly 9 percentage points 
of GDP between now and 2004, so that the share of these items in government spending 
might rise from 26 per cent to 38 per cent (see table 26). Nevertheless, the taxation of 
private-sector pension income offsets these costs and is estimated by the CPB to raise an 
additional revenue by 5.1 per cent of GDP between now and 2040 (IMF. 2002b: 6). However, 
these projections are highly sensitive to changes in the underlying assumptions, notably 
                                                            
12 The old-age dependency ratio will increase from 23 per cent in 2000 to 40 per cent in 2050, the lowest level of 
EMU-5 (see table 20). 
13 Both scenarios use the same macroeconomic assumptions: Both the inflation rate (2 per cent) and the real 
interest rate (4 per cent) as well as the labour productivity growth (1.75 per cent) are assumed constant and 
exogenous (for further information, see IMF. 2002b: 6sqq.).   12
concerning pension funds’ capital market returns and the current cyclical component of the 
budget balance. 
Moreover, the Dutch health care system suffers like health care systems in other EMU-
member countries from rigidities and distorted incentives (OECD. 2000). Over the past 
couple of years, authorities have been engaged in gradually modifying the health care system. 
However, no considerable reform has been adopted yet. 
 
1.2 Recent changes in fiscal frameworks 
Recently, national governments adopted several reforms concerning fiscal policy which are 
surveyed in the following. 
 
Belgium 
Within the framework of the SGP, the government adopted the Belgian Stability Programme 
covering the period of 1999-2002 (OECD. 2001b: 50sqq). This fiscal framework has been 
modified and updated several times. The authorities committed themselves to sustainable 
fiscal consolidation by setting permissible fiscal targets both for the budget of the federal 
government and the social security system spending (Entity I) and respectively for the regions, 
communities and local governments, too (Entity II)
14. To date, these objectives have mostly 
been met (see IMF. 2003). The recently built up budget surpluses were used to cut personal 
income tax rates including the abolition of the additional crisis surcharge (OECD. 2003a: 
55ff). The income tax cuts, particularly implemented by reducing the top rate from 55 to 50 
per cent and introducing an earned income tax credit, will totally reduce the tax burden to 0.8 
per cent of GDP by 2005 and to 1.3 per cent in 2006 (see OECD. 2003a: 32.) In addition, 
authorities also plan to reform the corporate tax system beginning in 2003, and expecting this 
reform to be revenue-neutral. 
 
France 
French authorities have pursued a strategy of multi-year consolidation of public finances 
consisting of four main pillars that compound mainly the control of government expenditures 
(i.e., limiting growth of public expenditure to 1.5 per cent p.a.) and a cut in the relatively 
heavy tax burden.
15 The tax reform comprises, for example, a reduction of direct taxes and a 
                                                            
14 For more detailed information see: OECD. 2001b: 50sqq and OECD: 2003a: 29sqq. 
15 Further pillars of this multi-year strategy are the reduction of social insurance contributions, free play of 
automatic stabilisers and a balanced budget target for 2004 or thereabouts. See: OECD. 2001c.   13
lowering of the rates of corporate and personal income taxes. Thus, the actual amounts of the 
cuts in direct taxation are comparatively modest as these are amounted to 1 percentage point 
of GDP in 2000, 0.6 in 2001 and are expected to represent 0.5 in 2002 (OECD. 2001c). In 
July 2002 a new centre-right government took office. Enhancing potential growth by cutting 
taxes and implementing structural reforms is one of their key concerns. Further developments 
are still to be awaited. 
 
Germany 
In Germany, the public finances have been heavily affected by the income and business tax 
reform phased in 1999. At its core is the “Tax Reduction Law” (Steuersenkungsgesetz) adopted 
in 2000. In this case, revenues lost are estimated to total more than 1 per cent of GDP in 
2002 (OECD. 2003b: 58). In course of these tax cuts, corporate income tax revenues 
collapsed almost completely. This is mainly a result of tax refunds consistent with earlier 
reductions of corporate tax rates for retained profits. These cuts had to be mainly financed by 
the Laender, which had to cope without more than 8.3 billions in 2001 (Deutscher Staedtetag: 
2001).  
An important step towards a sustainable fiscal framework is the Domestic Stability Pact, 
agreed in 2002, that was mainly established due to the impending caution from Brussels. 
There are two essential points to make about this: First, budgeted deficits of a federal state’s 
government must not exceed their investment spending. Second, there is a commitment to 
balanced budgets.  
 
Luxembourg 
Luxembourg’s recent development in fiscal policy was influenced by the Coalition 
Agreement, adopted in 1999. Thereby three main principles were formulated for sustainable 
fiscal policy. Firstly, the general government balance should remain in surplus. Secondly, the 
balance of central government should remain in equilibrium. Thirdly, current expenditure of 
central government should rise less rapidly than total government expenditure and nominal 
GDP equilibrium (OECD. 2001d: 31sqq). 
Furthermore, responding to large general government surpluses during recent years, national 
authorities implemented structural reforms comprising multi-year tax cuts and further 
expenditure restraints in 2001. The aim is to distribute the growth dividend widely, to further   14
increase the competitive position of Luxembourg and to address inactivity traps by raising tax 
thresholds
16. These tax cuts reduced the GDP to about 3.4 percentage points (IMF. 2002a). 
 
The Netherlands 
The main characteristics of Netherlands’ fiscal framework introduced in 1994 are, multi-year 
orientated expenditure ceilings and cautious growth assumptions. The 1998 Coalition 
Agreement further entrenched that kind of policy, mainly by setting cautious projections of 
economic growth rate. Another important feature of the medium-term budgetary framework 
is the strict separation of windfalls on the revenue and expenditure side of the budget (for 
further information see OECD. 2002b: 39). Ceilings were imposed on the spending for the 
central government, social security and health care. 
In 2001 a far-reaching overhaul of the tax system took place. It features a shift from direct to 
indirect taxes, a removing and reducing of tax exemptions, as well as a cut in replacement 
rates (detailed information see: OECD. 2000). Consequently, direct taxes on labour sunk by 2 
per cent of GDP while indirect taxes and environmental taxes have been raised by 0.5 and 0.2 
per cent of GDP. Moreover, a new system for a tax on income from wealth has been 
introduced, amounting to 0.5 per cent of GDP (OECD. 2002b: 47). Therefore, tax cuts 
amounted to 0.8 per cent of GDP, largely financed by constraints on expenditures (OECD. 
2002b: 37). 
 
2.  Role of political cycles 
Recently, the role of political cycles has often been discussed in relation to the Stability and 
Growth Pact. By establishing the 3 per cent of GDP deficit criterion and the limit of 60 per 
cent of GDP, the SGP had – as shown above – a strong implication on fiscal discipline. More 
recently however, the process of fiscal consolidation has stopped. Figure 13 displays the 
progress – or lack – towards lower public debts and deficits made during the initial years of 
EMU. On the horizontal axis the difference between the stock of public debt as a share of 
GDP and the 60 per cent Maastricht reference value is shown and on the vertical axis the 
difference between the budget deficit and the 3 per cent deficit ceiling
17. Regarding this, the 
situation in 1998 and 2002 is being compared. Progress in fiscal consolidation is represented 
by a move to the left and as well as downwards. The figure makes clear, that since the launch 
                                                            
16 For further information see: IMF. 2002a. 
17 Such a comparison was also calculated for EMU-11 (with the exception of Luxembourg) by Butti and van den 
Noord. 2003.    15
of the Euro, there has been no significant progress in budgetary consolidation, especially 
concerning the deficit. The reason for this is perhaps mainly because of the economic 
circumstances, but on the other hand it shows that the SGP displays a significant structural 
problem: the lack of incentives towards a further policy of consolidation. This structural 
deficit may well strengthen in electoral periods. As there are hardly any consequences when 
exceeding the Maastricht criteria, authorities could intend to additionally charge the national 
budgets in order to increase the probability of getting re-elected.  
Since the initial study by Nordhaus and Hibbs in the mid 1970s on political business cycles, 
there have been several contributions concerning politically motivated policies. More recently, 
Persson and Tabellini (2002a and 2002b) published two studies analysing the impact of 
different features of political systems on the running of fiscal policy. Here the results of the 
study by Buti and van den Noord (2003) are analysed.
18 In order to explore the behaviour of 
fiscal policy in the early years of EMU, Buti and van den Noord constructed an indicator of 
discretionary fiscal policy (DP). This indicator splits the primary fiscal balance up into two 
components, one part, which is consistent with a neutral stance of fiscal policy and the other, 
which can attributed to fiscal stimulus or contraction.
19 With the help of that indicator they 
showed that fiscal policy had become easier over the time. Within this framework they 
distinguish three phases: non-election years, pre- or early election years and full-blown 
election years (a survey of EMU-4 is displayed in table 27) in order to investigate if the 
loosening of fiscal policy may be related to political cycles. In this way, they were able to 
show that the electoral budget cycle is alive in EMU. This shows that the creation of the 
EMU, implying the SGP, did not hamper politically motivated fiscal policy behaviour.  
 
3.  Possible impact of the enlargement process on the European institutional 
setting for fiscal co-ordination 
The enlargement of the EU by ten Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) in 2004 
will charge the EU-15 budgets at least in the short run. There are several arguments in that 
respect. First, as so far enlargement processes have always led to a rise in EU expenditure 
(Baldwin et al 1997: 158). Secondly, the EU budget dimension: The current most important 
policies concerning the EU budget are the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the 
Structural Policy covering over 80 per cent of the total expenditure (European Commission. 
2000). Regarding the candidates, they are predominantly relatively poor (see figure 14) and 
                                                            
18 Due to a lack or erratic data Luxembourg is not considered by Buti and von den Noord. 
19 The exact way of calculation can be seen in Buti and van den Noord. 2002: 9.    16
agriculturally dominated (see figure 15). Consequently, the EU budget can be expected to 
encumber. Thirdly, political economy considerations suggest that current EU-expenditure per 
capita depends mostly on current national voting power per capita
20 (see table 28, figure 16). 
Due to the enlargement process, the voting power of the current EU-15 member states will 
be reduced and shifted towards the candidates. Further charges for the EU-15 are apparent. 
However, the actual size of corresponding transfers is being debated.
21 In the following, that 
size is analysed focusing on Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and The Netherlands. 
All these five countries are net contributors within the EU (see table 31). 
The first studies estimating the costs of enlargement were made in 1993.
22 Baldwin (1997) 
envisaged that in the course of the Visegrad-5
23 countries’ accession to the EU that extra 
budget cost would amount to about 20 billions ECU. Accordingly, the largest share of costs 
(over 70 per cent) would be financed by the four “big” countries namely Germany, France, 
UK and Italy (see table 29). Moreover, Dicke and Foders (2000) estimated the additional 
costs of enlargement. They assume that the EU-15 have to pay the costs of enlargement by 
increasing the contribution rates without being capable of cutting the overall EU-budget. The 
results of these estimations are summarised in table 30. According to their calculations, 
Germany, once again, would have to bear the brunt (24.6 per cent). France would follow 
(17.2 per cent), whereas The Netherlands (6 per cent) and Belgium (3.9 per cent) would be 
less charged. Luxembourg would be almost free of charge (0.2 per cent). 
Another way of calculating the future costs of enlargement is by estimating the changes of 
Europe’s expenditure system, thereby taking into account reforms especially in respect to 
CAP and structural policy. One of the recent and detailed studies is Weise et al. (2003)
24. He 
calculated four scenarios based on the model of current regulations for the allocation of 
structural and agricultural funds for both the EU-25 and the EU-27: “Moderate reform”, 
“medium reform”, “substantial reform”, and “status quo” being a control.
25 These scenarios 
are calculated for the first and the last (expected) year of the next mid term financial 
perspective, i.e. 2007 and 2013. 
                                                            
20 The Shabley Shubik Index (SSI) gives a measure for calculating the voting power of each Member States 
roughly by calculating the relative number a country is a pivotal players. Here the SSI is calculated in the 
European Council per capita and compared with the total EU-expenditures by capita. 
21 Due to an declaration of intent expressed by the European Commission in the Agenda 2000, the costs of 
enlargement are not to exceed 10.59 billions of Euro, referring to 0.113 per cent of GDP of EU-15. 
22 For a survey and own calculations see Baldwin, 1994, see also Breuss 1995. 
23 Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Poland. 
24 See also Weise 2002. For alternative overall scenario see Hall/Quaisser 2002. 
25 For detailed specifications of each scenario see: Weise. 2001: 73sqq.    17
The main financial consequences for the surveyed countries regarding 2007 (EU-25) are 
displayed in tables 32-34 (see figures 17, 18). Regarding 2007 (EU-25) the total expenditure is 
lower than estimated in Agenda 2000 mainly due to the smaller number of candidates joining 
(see table 33). Due to the enlargement of poorer candidates the EU-average GDP per capita 
will sink and the income positions of EU-15 rise relatively. After an enlargement, only 25 per 
cent of the EU-regions presently covered by objective 1 would remain within that group 
(Weise. 2002). As a result many regions will no longer be supported by EU funds. Overall, 
Germany will probably be charged most (about € 10 bn), especially if a moderate reform is 
implemented while Germany remains the second highest per capita beneficiary after 
Luxembourg. Furthermore, the highest relative increase of net contribution to the EU-budget 
will be on France: Presuming that a moderate reform will be adopted, the French net 
contribution would rise by € 6.5 billions. For all five countries the additional cost of 
enlargement will rise significantly. The effect on Belgium sizes about € 1 billion, the amount 
of The Netherlands’ charge varies between € 1.4-1.7 bn. Luxembourg paying the most per 
capita will most likely have to disburse a total amount of net payments of about 0.1-0.2 
billion. 
 
PART II: MONETARY POLICY 
The introduction of the Euro and the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 
1999
26 is a landmark event of singular importance to the European economy. The fact that 12 
European economies have bound themselves to a common currency has had multifarious 
implications for the macroeconomic environment, monetary policy and financial markets. 
Optimistic points of view, therefore, expected this to strengthen further economic and 
financial integration. However, the birth of the EMU was also related to a substantial market 
segmentation, a regional diversity, as well as cultural, legal and institutional diversity (Corsetti 
2000). In this context, the EMU does not appear to be an optimal currency area (Bayer 1999), 
but a union that could evoke difficulties, especially concerning a well-functioning European 
monetary policy. Regarding its future development, the launch of the Euro and the common 
monetary policy will possibly diminish current asymmetries over time. All currently available 
evidence however suggests that, in the nearer future, national heterogeneity and market 
segmentation are likely to prevail (Corsetti 2000). 
                                                            
26 In 1999 eleven members joined the EMU, namely Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Greece joined in 2001.   18
In the following, the heterogeneity of EMU-5 members
27 shall be surveyed. Have there been 
remarkable asymmetries among EMU-5 at the inception of the Euro? Have they been 
removed so far due to the process of European monetary integration? Or are there still 
asymmetric aspects in place, hampering the effectiveness of the European single monetary 
policy? The remainder is divided into two sections: First, a short survey is given concerning 
the theoretical framework. Secondly, the possibly existing heterogeneity is explored by 
investigating national diversity among EMU-5. Empirical studies on regional asymmetries 
within these countries should be taken with caution. The sample for the period since 1999 is 
too small for empirical testing, thus it is hardly possible to draw any final conclusions. 
Though, conservative empirical investigations may possibly point to some tendencies. The 
focus will be on two of the most important economic dispersion factors, namely the 
synchronisation of business cycles of EMU-5 and the development of inflation rates. 
 
1. Theoretical  background 
The debate on the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 is closely 
related to the dispute on heterogeneity and the effects of exogenous shocks. In this context, 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) stress, that if the EMU were not an optimal currency area, 
exogenous shocks will distinctly lead to differential effects upon regions and countries. This 
dispute dates back to the definition of the geographical area in which shocks are more likely 
to occur. There are two important studies opening this dispute: Mundell (1961) pointed out 
that the absence of internal homogeneity among countries could impede the optimality of a 
currency area. Kenen (1969), on the other hand, argued that the internal diversity of countries 
forming a currency area might be damaging to the success of the initiative. Consequently, the 
heterogeneity increases the extent and the probability of shocks. Naturally, the amplitude of 
shocks also depends on national preferences towards macro-objective or national 
performances in growth dynamics and institutional differences between countries, specifically 
in fiscal systems and labour markets (Fazio 2001). However, one of the main reasons for 
shocks’ occurrence lies in regional and structural differences among and within countries. 
Recently, several studies have addressed this debate once again. Von Hagen and Neumann 
(1992) noticed that the concept of optimal currency area is better defined with respect to 
regions rather than nations. However, de Grauwe and Vanhaverbecke pointed out that 
especially in case of long-run shocks strong divergences among economies are more likely to 
occur at the national rather than at the regional level. Overall, there is a broad consensus in 
                                                            
27 EMU-5 includes Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Netherlands.   19
the academic literature that the EMU does not represent an optimal currency area (Bayer 
1999). 
 
2.  Heterogeneity among EMU-5  
2.1. Synchronisation of business cycles 
Studying the challenges of a single monetary policy with respect to EMU-5, firstly, the degree 
of business cycles synchronisation is inquired. Generally, a common monetary policy has 
small costs as long as economic activity among countries and each corresponding optimal 
policy mix are coherent (Mihov 2001). In this regard, it has been advantageous that the 
correlation of business cycle fluctuations was quite high at the launch of the Euro. At the 
outset of EMU in 1999 most member countries – with the exception of Luxembourg – had 
similar cyclical conditions (see table 35) and inflation rates (see table 36). Accordingly, it 
seems quite understandable that a single monetary policy has been considered as well-
functioning. This might have been valid, even if other OCA-preconditions such as fiscal 
transfers and labour mobility were missing. In comparison to that optimistic point of view, 
scepticism has since then arose again, especially with respect to diverging growth rates and 
inflation disparity across EMU (see tables 35, 36). Thus, first economic trends shall be 
analysed here taking into account that the short period since the outset of EMU is hardly 
empirically satisfactory to determine the nature of these deviations
28. 
Relating to the synchronisation of business cycles of EMU-5, there are several appropriate 
indicators. Figure 19 shows the development of EMU-5 annual growth rates since 1986. At 
first glance it points at a sizeable fluctuation until 2000. Since 2001 the GDP growth rates of 
EMU-5 have run approximately simultaneously. This observation can be affirmed by 
comparing the standard deviations (see table 37, figure 20): From a relatively high value of 2.5 
in 2000 it sunk sharply to 0.5 in 2001 and is expected to stabilise at above 0.8 until 2004. At 
the same time the effects on synchronisation of the real GDP cycle in EMU-5 were higher 
than those of EMU-12 (see table 35, 37), even if the standard deviation of EMU-12 was also 
reduced in 2001. However, when analysing the variation-coefficient, they show neither a 
significant change in deviation of EMU-5 nor of EMU-12 since 1999 (see tables 35, 37, figure 
20).  
                                                            
28 The according data comprise only five years of observations, of which two years are projected by the OECD. 
Generally, the data used here is either by OECD Economic Outlook 2002 or from OECD Statistical 
Compendium Version 2001 and 2002.   20
Another simple measure of comparing differences of GDP growth rates is by calculating the 
absolute spread rates of GDP growth (see table 37, figure 20). This spread rate of EMU-5 
varies between 0.9 in 1992 and 8.2 in 1986 until 2000 before sharply decreasing in 2001 and 
reaching the second lowest level of an estimated 0.9 in 2002 (see table 37, figure 20). 
Nevertheless it is expected to increase again to 2.0 in 2004. The broad fluctuation can mainly 
be traced back to the extraordinary growth rates of Luxembourg. Excluding Luxembourg 
from the sample, absolute spread rates are smaller. They vary between 4.1 in 1991 and 0.6 in 
1995 and will further decrease to a projected 0.4 in 2004. Table 35 indicates that there has 
been a similar development relating this to the EMU-12. That development is characterised 
by a constantly sinking spread rate from 4.9 in 2000 to a projected 3.2 in 2004. This could be 
an evidence for a more homogenous development of business cycles between EMU-5. 
However, for a final conclusion a longer time horizon is necessary. 
A more demanding approach in comparing business cycle was made by Mihov (2001). As 
data for European quarterly GDP growth rates are not available for the 1960s, he calculated 
the time-varying correlations of growth rates of industrial production for some countries. 
Here this pair-wise correlations are calculated for the EMU-5 and displayed in figure 21. The 
correlations closes to one (to zero) indicating that during the respective calculated ten-year 
period economic fluctuations were highly (or not) positively synchronised. The developments 
of this sample can be decomposed into four periods of interest. Before 1973, the correlations 
across countries were relatively low. After 1973, the influence of the first oil price shock 
contributed to co-movements across countries in terms of a significant increase of 
synchronisation of output fluctuations. In the third period, beginning in the mid 1980s, this 
synchronisation decreased again and the time-varying correlations differed more sharply. The 
last period is characterised by an increasing spread of pair-wise correlations. It should be 
taken into account that differences in the dynamics of the cross-country correlations may be 
traced back to changing stances of economic policy co-ordination in Europe. Accordingly, we 
would expect that the correlations between the EMU-5 should have risen in course of EMU. 
The creation of the EMU, enhancing the single market programme may have led to an 
increase in trade between member countries. In correspondence to this, asymmetries among 
them should have diminished or at least decreased. Figure 21 confirms this expectation in 
respect to Germany and France, whose time-varying correlations reached an all-time high of 
about 0.9 at the end of 2002. Accordingly, tighter trade linkages may explain that rise (cf. 
Frankel and Rose (1998) and Clark and van Wincoop (2000)). A similar dynamic, though less 
stronger, can be observed for Germany and Belgium: After the onset of EMU their   21
correlation increased from about 0.6 at the end of 1990s to nearly 0.8 in 2002. The same 
holds for Netherlands and Belgium (from 0.46 to 0.58) within the same period of time. 
However, there has been a decline in correlation for some countries while trade within the 
EMU-5 has not been decreasing: The correlations between The Netherlands and 
Luxembourg for example declined from 0.64 in 1999 to 0.47 in 2002. An even stronger 
decline can be observed in the correlations between France and Belgium. Since the launch of 
the Euro their correlation has diminished from 0.18 to about zero in 2002. Moreover, 
correlation of business cycles between France and The Netherlands turned even (slightly) 
negative to 0.11 in 2002. 
Therefore, the introduction of the Euro does not seem to have really led to an increase in 
homogeneity among EMU-5, particularly with regard to the correlation of industrial 
production. In contrast, figure 21 even suggests that the spread is larger than ever among 
EMU-5 in 2002. 
 
2.2. Inflation rate 
Another relevant source of calculating heterogeneity is related to inflation rates. In the 
following, developments of consumer price indices (CPI) are analysed. Figure 22 displays the 
dynamics of annual consumer price indices since 1986. Standard deviations of EMU-5 differ 
between 1.6 in 1987 and about 0.2 in 1997, the lowest level of the observed period (see table 
38). In that respect, until today the introduction of the Euro does not seem to have brought 
any progress in aligning interest rates differentials. Comparing variation-coefficients of EMU-
5 provides a similar result (see table 38, figure 23). After a remarkable decrease in 1987, they 
are likely to fluctuate between about 0.1 and 0.5 until 2004. Accordingly, a significant progress 
in homogenising interest rates differentials between EMU-5 has not been made. 
However, turning to the dynamics of consumer price indices of EMU-12 leads to a piece of 
rather good news (see table 36). In that case, diversity among EMU-12 has been reduced 
since 1986, implying a decreasing of standard deviation from nearly 6.7 in 1986 to 0.7 in 1999 
(see table 36). These effects result mostly from decreasing inflation rates of in Portugal and 
Greece due to their progressive compliance with Maastricht criteria. Since the launch of the 
common currency in 1999 the diversity increased only slightly again to a relatively low level of 
about 1.0 in 2001. Calculations of variation coefficients provide a similar result: After a sharp 
decrease up to 1999 the diversity rose again in 2000. However, this rise is a bit stronger than 
that of the standard deviation (see table 36).    22
Another approach of comparing the diversity of CPI is calculating the inflation rate 
dispersion (measured by the absolute spread). This approach has also been made by Maier 
and Hendrikx (2002), who especially concentrated on investigating regional diversity within 
three EMU countries concerning the development of inflation rates. Excluding Luxembourg, 
figure 24 points to a significant fall of the absolute spread of EMU-11: Since 1993 the 
inflation rate dispersion has fallen from a level of about 25 percentage points to a level below 
5 percentage points since the end of 1999. This could be a signal of increasing homogeneity 
within EMU, particularly in course of the process of Maastricht convergence. Compared with 
the inflation rate-dispersion of EMU-4 (see figure 25), the inflation rate dispersion has sunk 
since 1983 from 13 percentage points to about 3 percentage points in 2001. However, the 
most significant decreases took place in the mid 1980s and can therefore hardly be related to 
the creation of EMU. 
Summing up, since the creation of the EMU an alignment of inflation rates of the EMU-12 
has taken place, whereas the effected development of the EMU-4 does not show significant 
changes. It must be considered however, that these results are mainly influenced by the 
strictly decreasing inflation rates of Greece and Portugal.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The fiscal consolidation of the surveyed countries has recently slowed down, after a 
remarkable progress was made since Maastricht at the beginning of the 1990s. Until recently, 
this could also be traced back to the European Stability and Growth Pact. However, the 
process of fiscal consolidation has recently been stopped mainly due to an overall economic 
slowdown. In this respect, long-term future prospects will be further dampened by problems 
of an ageing population together with further expenditure in health-care and pension systems. 
In the short-run, the eastward enlargement will additionally strain the budgets of EMU-5. In 
context of monetary policy affairs, the diversity of EMU-5 members has been surveyed. Here, 
an attempt has been made to sketch recent developments since the launch of the Euro in 
1999. The short comparison of two main aspects of the monetary union – the GDP growth 
rates and the inflation rate – indicates that diversity among the surveyed countries still exists. 
Contrary to initial expectations in academia, the heterogeneity especially with regard to the 
synchronisation of business cycles, does not seem to have been removed. However, it should 
be noticed that empirical investigations are to be taken with caution due to the short period 
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Figure 15: Agricultural Sector Share (in pct. gross value added) (1999)  34
Source:  calculations of the SSI are quoted from: Aleskerov. 2002, Data concerning Total EU-expenditures: 
EC. 2000. Own calculations.  
 
 
Source: Weise. 2003. Own calculations. 
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Source: Weise. 2003. Own calculations. 
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Source: OECD. Statistical Compendium Version 2002.  
 
 






































France - Germany Belgium - Germany France - Belgium France - Netherlands
Germany - Luxembourg Belgium - Luxembourg Netherlands - Luxembourg Netherlands - Belgium
Netherlands - Germany France - Netherlands
Figure 22: Consumer prices indices EMU-5 
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Source: OECD. 2002. Economic Outlook 72. Own calculations. 
 
 
Source: OECD. Statistical Compendium. Version 2001. 
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TABLES: 
      
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002* 2003* 2004*
BEL -2.0 -0.7 -0.5 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.5
FRA -3.0 -2.7 -1.6 -1.3 -1.4 -2.7 -2.9 -2.5
GER -2.7 -2.2 -1.5 1.1 -2.8 -3.7 -3.3 -2.6
Lux 2.8 3.1 3.6 5.6 6.1 1.8 0.3 0.5
NED -1.1 -0.8 0.7 2.2 0.1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.3
Euro-Area -2.6 -2.3 -1.3 0.1 -1.5 -2.2 -2.1 -1.8
EU -2.5 -1.8 -0.8 0.8 -1.0 -2.0 -1.9 -1.6
Source: OECD. 2002. Economic Outlook 72.
      
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002* 2003* 2004*
BEL 5.7 6.5 6.2 6.6 6.6 5.7 5.2 5.1
FRA 0.2 0.5 1.3 1.6 1.4 0.1 -0.1 0.3
GER 0.5 1.1 1.6 4.1 0.2 -0.6 -0.1 0.7
Lux 2.0 2.1 2.8 4.7 5.2 1.1 -0.5 -0.3
NED 3.3 3.4 4.5 5.4 2.8 1.8 1.9 2.1
Euro-Area 2.0 2.1 2.5 3.8 2.0 1.2 1.2 1.5
EU 2.0 2.4 2.8 4.2 2.3 1.2 1.2 1.5
Source: OECD. 2002. Economic Outlook 72.
      
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002* 2003* 2004*
BEL -1.5 -0.3 -0.7 -0.9 0.3 0.9 1.0 1.0
FRA -1.6 -1.9 -1.2 -1.7 -1.7 -2.5 -2.6 -2.4
GER -1.7 -1.4 -0.9 -1.5 -2.4 -2.7 -2.3 -2.1
NED -1.6 -1.7 -0.8 0.1 -0.2 0.4 1.0 1.3
Euro-Area -1.7 -1.7 -1.0 -1.3 -1.5 -1.6 -1.4 -1.4
EU -1.8 -1.3 -0.6 -0.8 -1.0 -1.4 -1.2 -1.2
Source: OECD. 2002. Economic Outlook 72.
      
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002* 2003* 2004*
BEL 6.1 6.9 6.0 5.7 6.4 6.5 6.1 5.6
FRA 1.5 1.3 1.7 1.2 1.2 0.3 0.2 0.4
GER 1.5 1.8 2.2 1.5 0.6 0.3 0.8 1.1
NED 2.9 2.5 3.1 3.4 2.5 3.0 3.4 3.6
Euro-Area 2.9 2.7 2.8 2.4 2.0 1.8 1.9 1.9
EU 2.7 2.8 3.0 2.7 2.3 1.8 1.9 1.9
Source: OECD. 2002. Economic Outlook 72.
Tabl e  1:   Ge ne r a l   gover nm ent   f i nanci al   bal ances                                                                                 
Sur pl us  ( +)   or   def i ci t   ( - )   as  a  per cent age  of   nom i nal   GDP
Est i ma t es  and  pr oj ect i ons
Tabl e  2:   Ge ne r a l   gover nm ent   pr i ma r y   bal ances                                                                                   
Sur pl us  ( +)   or   def i ci t   ( - )   as  a  per   cent   of   nom i nal   GDP
Est i ma t es  and  pr oj ect i ons
Tabl e  3:   Cycl i cal l y- adj ust ed  gener al   gover nm ent   bal ances                                                               
Sur pl us  ( +)   or   def i ci t   ( - )   as  a  per   cent   of   pot ent i al   GDP
Est i ma t es  and  pr oj ect i ons
Tabl e  4:   Cycl i cal l y- adj ust ed  gener al   gover nm ent   pr i ma r y   bal ances                                                   
Sur pl us  ( +)   or   def i ci t   ( - )   as  a  per   cent   of   pot ent i al   GDP
Est i ma t es  and  pr oj ect i ons  41
 
 
     
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002* 2003* 2004*
BEL 7.7 7.3 6.6 6.5 6.2 5.7 5.2 4.6
FRA 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8
GER 3.2 3.3 3.1 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.2
Lux -0.8 -0.9 -0.7 -0.9 -0.9 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8
NED 4.4 4.2 3.8 3.2 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.3
Euro-area 4.7 4.4 3.8 3.7 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.3
EU 4.5 4.2 3.6 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.1
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 72, 2002.
     
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002* 2003* 2004*
BEL 124.8 119.5 114.8 109.6 108.6 105.4 101.9 97.3
FRA 68.2 70.4 66.2 65.4 65.0 66.7 68.4 69.1
GER 61.8 63.2 61.2 60.5 60.2 62.4 63.7 64.1
Lux 6.1 6.3 6.0 5.6 5.6 6.0 6.0 6.0
NED 69.9 66.8 63.1 55.8 52.8 51.7 50.6 49.0
Source: OECD. 2002. Economic Outlook 72.
     
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002* 2003* 2004*
BEL 115.9 110.4 105.6 100.7 98.1 95.2 91.8 87.2
FRA 43.3 41.7 33.6 34.9 37.7 39.4 41.0 41.7
GER 43.4 46.0 44.8 41.9 44.3 47.2 49.2 50.1
NED 55.3 53.7 50.2 44.5 41.6 40.8 39.6 37.9
Euro-Arena 59.7 59.8 55.1 53.2 53.9 54.7 55.0 54.5
EU 55.9 56.2 51.3 48.4 48.4 49.0 49.1 48.6
Source: OECD. 2002. Economic Outlook 72.
     
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002* 2003* 2004*
BEL 48.6 48.0 47.2 46.7 46.5 46.1 45.7 44.8
FRA 50.5 49.9 49.5 48.7 48.8 49.4 49.4 48.8
GER 46.5 46.0 46.1 43.3 45.7 46.1 46.1 45.1
Lux 41.6 40.0 39.6 38.0 38.6 42.5 44.4 43.9
NED 44.4 43.4 43.0 41.4 42.0 42.9 42.8 42.4
Euro-Area 47.0 46.3 45.9 44.1 45.2 45.5 45.2 44.7
EU 46.0 45.2 44.7 43.0 44.5 44.8 44.6 44.3
Source: OECD. 2002. Economic Outlook 72.
Tabl e  7:   Ge ne r a l   gover nm ent   net   f i nanci al   l i abi l i t i es                                                                 
Per   cent   of   nom i nal   GDP
Est i ma t es  and  pr oj ect i ons
Tabl e  8:   Ge ne r a l   gover nm ent   t ot al   out l ays                                                                                 
Per   cent   of   nom i nal   GDP
Est i ma t es  and  pr oj ect i ons
Tabl e  5:   Ge ne r a l   gover nm ent   net   debt   i nt erest   paym ent s                                                         
Per   cent   of   nom i nal   GDP
Est i ma t es  and  pr oj ect i ons
Tabl e  6:   Ge ne r a l   gover nm ent   gr oss  f i nanci al   l i abi l i t i es                                                             
Per   cent   of   nom i nal   GDP






     
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002* 2003* 2004*
BEL 124.8 119.5 114.8 109.6 108.6 105.4 101.9 97.3
FRA 59.3 59.5 58.5 57.3 57.3 59.3 61.2 62.2
GER 61.0 60.9 61.2 60.2 59.5 61.7 63.0 63.4
Lux 6.1 6.3 6.0 5.6 5.6 6.0 6.0 6.0
NED 69.9 66.8 63.1 55.8 52.8 51.7 50.6 49.0
Source: OECD. 2002. Economic Outlook 72.
     
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002* 2003* 2004*
BEL 46.6 47.2 46.7 46.8 46.9 46.1 45.7 45.3
FRA 47.4 47.3 47.8 47.4 47.4 46.7 46.5 46.3
GER 43.5 43.8 44.6 44.4 43.0 42.3 42.8 42.5
Lux 44.4 43.1 43.1 43.7 44.7 44.4 44.7 44.5
NED 43.3 42.6 43.6 43.6 42.1 42.0 42.2 42.2
Euro-Area 44.4 44.0 44.6 44.3 43.7 43.2 43.1 42.9
EU 43.5 43.5 43.9 43.8 43.5 42.8 42.8 42.7
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 72, 2002.
Tabl e  9:   M aast richt   def i ni t i on  of   gener al   gover nm ent   gr oss  publ i c  debt                                  
Per   cent   of   nom i nal   GDP
Est i ma t es  and  pr oj ect i ons
Tabl e  10:   Ge ne r a l   gover nm ent   cu rren t  t ax  and  non- t ax  recei pt s                                             
Per   cent   of   nom i nal   GDP
Est i ma t es  and  pr oj ect i ons
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Public sector accounts
Revenue 51.2 51.8 51.4 51.1 51.2 50.7 50.7
Expenditure 53.8 53.5 52.7 52.6 53.9 53.6 52.9
General Government balance -2.7 -1.6 -1.3 -1.5 -2.6 -2.8 -2.3
Structural balance -1.5 -0.9 -1.6 -1.6 -2.0 -2.0 -1.6
Primary balance 0.9 1.7 1.9 1.7 0.5 0.3 0.8
Gross debt 59.5 58.5 57.3 56.9 58.4 59.3 59.2
Source: IMF. 2002d.
Table 11: France - Main Economic Indicators










rates          
1970-1998
1998
Change       
1970-1998
BEL 2,050 n.a. BEL 8.6 n.a.
FRA 2,043 3.8 FRA 9.4 3.7
GER 2,361 3.4 GER 10.3 4.0
Lux 2,246 5.2 Lux 6.0 2.5
NED 2,150 2.6 NED 8.7 1.5
Source: OECD. 2001. Health at a Glance. Source: OECD. 2001. Health at a Glance.
Table 13: Expenditure on health as a 
percentage of GDP, 1998
Table 12: Health expenditure per capita 
(US$ economy-wide PPP), 1998






BEL 81.4 85.5 75.3 80.5 BEL 19.8 33.8 15.6 25.8
FRA 82.8 87.0 74.8 80.0 FRA 20.8 33.3 16.3 
1 30.4
GER 80.8 85.0 74.7 80.0 GER 19 30.1 15.3 23.4
Lux 80.5 73.7   Lux 19.2 n.a. 14.7² n.a.
NED 80.9 85.0 75.5 80.0 NED 18.7 22.9 14.7 5.8
 
1 Data from 1997
² Data from 1995
Source: OECD, quoted from: Dang. 2001. Source: OECD. 2001. Health at a Glance.
Table 14: Life expectancy at birth Table 15: Life expectancy at age 65, 1998
Females Males Females Males
BEL 5.3 BEL -4.4
FRA 4.3 FRA -4.6
GER 4.6 GER -5.0
Lux 4.7 Lux -4.8
NED 5.2 NED -3.1
Table 17: Average annual decline in 
infant mortality rates 1960-1999
Source: OECD. 2001. Health at a Glance. Source: OECD. 2001. Health at a Glance.
Table 16: Infant mortality           
















Tabl e  20:   Ol d- Age  Dependency  Rat i os 
1
Source: OECD. 2001. 
1 The old-age dependency is defined as the number of 
people over 65 divided by those 20 to 64 years old.
2000 2050 1999
% growth rate 
1960-1999
BEL 1.54 1.80 BEL 16.8 40.0
FRA 1.73 1.80 FRA 15.9 37.1
GER 1.40 1.50 GER 16.8 55.6
Lux ... ... Lux 14.3 32.4
NED 1.71 1.80 NED 13.6 51.1
Table 18: Fertility                      
children per woman
Source: OECD, quoted from Dang. 2001.   Source: OECD. 2001. Health at a Glance.
Table 19: Share of population aged 65+, 
1999
      
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2020-2030 2020-2050
BEL 10.0 9.9 11.4 13.3 13.7 13.3 3.3 3.3
FRA 12.1 13.1 15.0 16.0 15.8 ... 3.9 ...
GER 11.8 11.2 12.6 15.5 16.6 16.9 3.7 5.1
Lux 7.4 7.5 8.2 9.2 9.5 9.3 1.8 1.9
NED 7.9 9.1 11.1 13.1 14.1 13.6 5.2 5.7
Euro-Area 10.4 10.4 11.5 13.0 13.6 13.3 2.6 2.9
Tabl e  21:   Pr oj ect i ons  of   Pensi on  Expendi t ur e  EMU- 5                                                               
Per   cent   of   GDP
Changes  dur i ng
















2001 2015 2030 2050 2001-50
Public pensions 9.7 10 13.5 14.8 5.1
Public sector employees' pensions 1.4 1.7 2.3 2.4 1.0
Public health care 7.3 7.8 8.2 8.6 1.3
Long-term care for the elderly 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.5 0.7
Child-related expenditure 4.4 3.9 3.5 3.0 -1.4
Total 23.7 24.5 28.7 30.4 6.7
Table 23: Germany - Evolution of Age-Related Government spending
Sources: German authorities; IMF staff projections. Quoted from: IMF. 2002c.
Change 
during
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2000-2050
Fiscal cost of aging:
Public Pensions 8.8 8.2 9.5 11.1 11.8 11.8 3.1
Public health care 6.2 6.9 7.5 8.2 8.9 9.3 3.1
Unemployment benefits & other 7.3 6.2 6.1 5.7 5.3 5.2 -2.1
Total 22.3 21.3 23.1 25.0 26.0 26.3 4.1
Implied ratios:
Old-age dependency ratio 0.41 0.44 0.53 0.63 0.66 0.69 0.28
Eligibility ratio 0.94 0.90 0.93 0.99 1.04 1.03 0.10
Transfer ratio 16.2 15.3 14.9 14.4 13.9 13.5 -2.66
Employment ratio 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 -0.16
Table 22: Belgium - Projections of Fiscal Costs of Aging, Base case                    
in per cent of GDP

























Source: OECD and CPB. Quoted from IMF. 2002b. 
Tabl e  25:   Pr i vat e  Pensi on  Fund  Asset s 
Only the Netherlands have mandatory private pension 
schemes.
2001 2005 2015 2030 2050
Revenue 45.5 44.2 43.8 45 45.1
Expenditure      
Age-related 23.7 23.1 23.1 25.7 26.7
Unemployment support
1 1.4 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8
Interest 3.2 3.2 2.4 1.8 2.0
Other 20.0 18.5 17.2 17.2 17.2
Total 48.3 45.8 43.5 45.5 46.6
Balance -2.8 -1.6 0.3 -0.5 -1.5
Public debt 59.5 59.9 44.0 34.0 36.7
Sources: German authorities; IMF staff projections. Quoted from: IMF. 2002c. 
Table 24: Germany: General Government Operations, 2001-50                         
Entitlement Reform Scenario
1 Unemployment benefits and assistance as well as other payments to the unemployed, excluding social 
security contributions on their behalf.  47
 
2001 2010 2020 2040 2060 2080
 
Revenues
Income tax + social security contributions 20.7 21.7 22.5 24.2 24.1 23.8
of which: from pension income 1.8 2.1 2.9 4.9 4.9 4.9
Corporate tax 3.6 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2
Indirect taxes & other 19.2 19.5 20.0 21.2 21.2 21.2
of which: from pension income 1.5 1.7 2.3 3.5 3.5 3.5
Revenue from asset (e.g. Gas) 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.6 1.3 1.4
Total 45.8 46.5 47.7 50.2 49.8 49.6
Expenditure
Social security 10.9 12.4 13.9 15.9 15.3 15.4
Public pensions 4.7 5.4 6.8 9.0 8.3 8.5
Disability benefits 2.7 3.3 3.6 3.4 3.5 3.5
Unemployment benefits 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
Other 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
Healthcare 7.0 7.7 8.6 10.6 10.3 10.2
Education 4.4 4.6 4.4 4.6 4.5 4.6
Other primary expenditure 19.1 19.5 19.5 19.5 19.5 19.5
Interest payments 3.5 2.1 1.7 2.9 5.5 8.8
Total 44.9 46.3 48.1 53.5 55.1 58.6
Budget balance (EMU definition) 0.9 0.2 -0.4 -3.3 -5.3 -9.0
Primary balance 4.4 2.3 1.3 -0.4 0.2 -0.2
Government debt (EMU definition) 54 36 28 51 98 157
Net government wealth 27 42 45 18 -31 -90
 
Revenues
Income tax + social security contributions 20.7 21.7 22.5 24.2 24.1 23.8
of which: from pension income 1.8 2.1 2.9 4.9 4.9 4.9
Corporate tax 3.6 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2
Indirect lax & other 19.9 20.2 20.7 21.9 21.9 21.9
of which: from pension income 1.5 1.7 2.3 3.5 3.5 3.5
Revenue from asset (e.g. Gas) 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.6 1.3 1.4
Total 46.5 47.2 48.4 50.9 50.5 50.3
Expenditure
Social security 10.9 12.4 13.9 15.9 15.3 15.5
Public pensions 4.7 5.4 6.8 9.0 8.3 8.5
Disability benefils 2.7 3.3 3.6 3.4 3.5 3.5
Unemployment benefits 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
Other 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
Health care 7.0 7.7 8.6 10.6 10.3 10.2
Education 4.4 4.6 4.4 4.6 4.5 4.6
Other primary expenditure 19.1 19.5 19.5 19.5 19.5 19.5
Interest payments 3.5 1.7 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.6
Total 44.9 45.9 47.2 51.0 50.4 50.4
Budget balance (EMU definition) 1.6 1.3 1.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.1
Primary balance 5.1 3.0 2.0 0.3 0.9 0.5
Government debt (EMU definition) 54 28 12 8 13 10
1 'Same macroeconomic assumptions applied to both scenarios.
Table 26: The Netherlands - Budget Projections Under Alternative Scenarios
1           
as a per cent of GDP
Base case scenario
Adjustment scenario
Sources: CPB and the IMF staff estimates, quoted from IMF. 2002b: 13.  48
 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002
Belgium General elections - - -
France - - Pre-election year General election
Germany - - Pre-election year General election
Netherlands - Pre-election year General elections -
Source: Quoted from Buti and van den Noord. 2003. 
Table 27: Elections in Euro area countries 1999-2002
Straight line
Straight line without poor-4 
paying extra
Gains share pro rata 
(from Table)
AUT 0.5 0.6 0.5
BEL-Lux 0.9 1.0 0.5
DEN 0.4 0.4 0.4
ESP 1.4 0.0 1.4
FIN 0.3 0.3 0.3
FRA 3.7 4.1 3.9
GER 6.2 7.0 6.8
GRE 0.3 0.3 0.3
IRL 0.2 0.0 0.1
ITA 2.3 2.6 1.7
NED 1.2 1.4 0.9
POR 0.3 0.0 -0.1
SWE 0.5 0.5 0.8
UK 2.0 2.2 2.8
EU-15 20.0 20.0 20.0
1 Costs calculated by Baldwin. 1997.
Table 29: Possible distribution of extra budget costs (Baldwin)
1                    












2000 1995-99 2000 1995-99 2000 1995
AUT 1,134 1,385 12 14 1,145 1,399 8.078 141.74 173.19 0.044 0.0054
BEL 1,953 1,958 2,192 2,400 4,146 4,358 10.203 406.35 427.13 0.056 0.0055
DEN 1,546 1,615 34 40 1,580 1,655 5.301 298.06 312.21 0.033 0.0062
ESP 11,629 10,901 27 27 11,656 10,928 39.371 296.06 277.56 0.093 0.0024
FIN 806 1,380 14 16 820 1,396 5.153 159.13 270.91 0.033 0.0064
FRA 11,846 12,188 193 266 12,039 12,454 58.848 204.58 211.63 0.119 0.0020
GER 9,673 10,233 130 143 9,803 10,376 82.024 119.51 126.50 0.119 0.0015
GRE 5,233 5,571 14 19 5,247 5,590 10.516 498.95 531.57 0.056 0.0053
IRL 3,000 2,600 15 25 3,015 2,625 3.705 813.77 708.50 0.033 0.0089
ITA 7,862 10,771 92 109 7,954 10,880 57.583 138.13 188.94 0.119 0.0021
Lux 114 106 776 802 890 908 0.427 2084.31 2126.46 0.021 0.0492
NED 2,154 2,227 42 50 2,196 2,277 15.700 139.87 145.03 0.056 0.0036
POR 3,739 3,246 12 11 3,751 3,257 9.899 378.93 329.02 0.056 0.0057
SWE 936 1,195 14 20 950 1,215 8.851 107.33 137.27 0.044 0.0050
UK 6,062 7,768 89 128 6,151 7,896 59.237 103.84 133.30 0.119 0.0020
EU-15 67687 73141 3655 4069 71342 77211 37.490 1902.98 2059.53 1  
1 Source: calculations of the SSI concerning the voting power in the European Council since 1995 and are quoted from: Aleskerov. 2002. Data 
concerning Total expenditures: European Commission. 2002. Own calculations.













Rate of contribution 
1999
Fiscal costs of EU-enlargement 


















Source: Dicke and Foders. 2000. Quoted from: Spannbauer. 2002. 
p. 91.








Table 31: Net payments per capita 1995-















BEL -597 -1,180 -1,182 -1,016 -988
FRA -316 -2,562 -6,823 -2,843 -2,769
GER -7,305 -11,127 -11,604 -9,754 -9,537
Lux -96 -120 -115 -106 -104









BEL -59 -117 -117 -100 -98
FRA -5 -41 -110 -46 -45
GER -90 -137 -143 -120 -117
Lux -210 -262 -251 -231 -227
NED -75 -104 -107 -90 -87
Table 34: Net Payments per capita in various Scenarios, 2007          
(in Euro)
EU-25
Source: Weise. 2003. Expanded by own calculations.





in per cent of 
GDP
EU-15 Status quo 71.640 0.77
EU-25 Status quo 85.306 0.88
Moderate Reform 65.311 0.67
Medium Reform 72.989 0.75
Substantial Reform 72.013 0.74
EU-27 Status quo 88.920 0.91
Moderate Reform 68.750 0.70
Medium Reform 76.401 0.78





Table 32: EU budget according to Expenditure Categories in 
various Scenarios, 2007 and 2013, in Euro (billions)
Total Expenditures 













1975-85 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001* 2002* 2003*
AUT 5.0 1.7 1.5 1.9 2.6 3.3 3.1 3.5 3.2 2.7 1.6 1.8 1.2 0.8 0.5 2.0 2.3 1.7 1.6
BEL 6.7 1.3 1.6 1.2 3.1 3.4 3.9 2.2 2.5 2.4 1.3 1.8 1.5 0.9 1.1 2.7 2.4 1.6 1.4
FIN 9.4 2.9 4.1 5.1 6.6 6.1 4.6 3.2 3.3 1.6 0.4 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.3 3.0 2.7 1.7 2.0
FRA 10.1 2.5 3.3 2.7 3.5 3.6 3.4 2.4 2.2 1.7 1.8 2.1 1.3 0.7 0.6 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.8
GER 3.9 -0.1 0.2 1.3 2.8 2.7 4.0 5.1 4.4 2.8 1.7 1.2 1.5 0.6 0.6 2.1 2.4 1.6 1.4
GREC 18.4 23.0 16.4 13.5 13.7 20.4 19.5 15.9 14.4 10.9 8.9 7.9 5.4 4.5 2.1 2.9 3.7 3.8 3.3
IRE 13.2 3.8 3.1 2.2 4.0 3.3 3.2 3.1 1.4 2.3 2.5 2.2 1.2 2.1 2.5 5.3 4.0 4.7 4.3
ITA 15.0 5.8 4.7 5.1 6.3 6.5 6.2 5.0 4.5 4.2 5.4 4.0 1.9 2.0 1.7 2.6 2.3 2.5 2.3
Lux 6.7 0.3 -0.1 1.4 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.2 3.6 2.2 1.9 1.2 1.4 1.0 1.0 3.8 2.4 2.1 1.7
NED 5.1 0.1 -0.7 0.7 1.1 2.5 3.1 2.8 1.7 2.2 1.6 1.4 1.9 1.8 2.0 2.3 5.1 4.0 2.7
POR 23.3 11.8 9.4 9.7 12.6 13.4 11.4 8.9 5.9 5.0 4.0 2.9 1.9 2.2 2.2 2.8 4.4 3.5 2.8
ESP 15.4 8.8 5.2 4.8 6.8 6.7 5.9 5.9 4.9 4.6 4.6 3.6 1.9 1.8 2.2 3.5 2.8 3.5 3.0
Max spread 19.3 23.1 17.1 12.8 12.6 18.0 16.4 13.6 13.0 9.3 8.5 6.8 4.3 3.9 1.9 3.4 3.3 3.1 2.9
Euro area 7.3 2.5 2.6 2.7 3.8 5.8 4.3 3.8 3.4 2.8 2.6 2.3 1.7 1.2 1.1 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.2
Mean 11.0 5.2 4.1 4.1 5.5 6.3 6.0 5.1 4.3 3.5 3.0 2.6 1.9 1.6 1.5 2.9 3.0 2.7 2.4
Standard deviation 6.1 6.7 4.8 3.9 4.0 5.4 4.9 3.9 3.4 2.6 2.4 1.9 1.2 1.1 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.1 0.9
Variation coefficient 0.6 1.3 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
Source: OECD. 2002. Economic Outlook 72.
Table 36: Consumer prices indices
Percentage change from previous period
Estimates and 
projections
 average Estimates and projections
1975-85 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002* 2003* 2004*
AUT 2.4 2.1 1.6 3.4 4.2 4.7 3.3 2.3 0.4 2.6 1.6 2.0 1.6 3.5 2.8 3.0 1.0 0.7 1.9 2.6
BEL 2.1 1.8 2.4 4.6 3.6 3.0 1.8 1.3 -0.7 3.3 2.3 0.8 3.9 2.1 3.2 3.7 0.8 0.7 2.1 2.8
FIN 2.9 2.5 4.2 4.7 5.1 0.0 -6.3 -3.3 -1.1 4.0 3.8 4.0 6.3 5.3 4.1 6.1 0.7 1.6 3.2 3.8
FRA 2.3 2.3 2.5 4.2 4.3 2.6 1.0 1.3 -0.9 1.9 1.8 1.1 1.9 3.5 3.2 4.2 1.8 1.0 1.9 2.9
GER 2.2 2.4 1.5 3.7 3.9 5.7 5.1 2.2 -1.1 2.3 1.7 0.8 1.4 2.0 2.0 2.9 0.6 0.4 1.5 2.5
GREC 2.1 0.5 -2.3 4.3 3.8 0.0 3.1 0.7 -1.6 2.0 2.1 2.4 3.6 3.4 3.6 4.2 4.1 3.6 3.9 3.8
IRE 3.5 -0.4 4.7 5.2 5.8 8.5 1.9 3.3 2.7 5.8 10.0 7.8 10.8 8.6 10.8 11.5 6.0 3.6 3.6 4.4
ITA 3.0 2.5 3.0 3.9 2.9 2.0 1.4 0.8 -0.9 2.2 2.9 1.1 2.0 1.8 1.6 2.9 1.8 0.3 1.5 2.5
Lux 2.4 10.0 4.0 8.5 9.8 5.3 8.6 1.8 4.2 3.8 1.3 3.7 7.7 7.5 6.0 8.9 1.0 0.8 2.5 4.5
NED 1.9 2.8 1.4 2.6 4.7 4.1 2.3 2.0 0.8 3.2 2.3 3.0 3.8 4.3 4.0 3.3 1.3 0.1 1.6 2.6
POR 3.0 4.1 6.4 7.5 6.4 4.0 4.4 1.1 -2.0 1.0 4.3 3.5 4.0 4.6 3.8 3.7 1.6 0.4 1.5 2.3
ESP 1.6 3.3 5.5 5.1 4.8 3.8 2.5 0.9 -1.0 2.4 2.8 2.4 4.0 4.3 4.2 4.2 2.7 1.8 2.5 3.0
Euro area 2.3 2.4 2.5 4.1 4.0 3.6 2.5 1.4 -0.8 2.3 2.2 1.4 2.3 2.9 2.8 3.6 1.5 0.8 1.8 2.7
European Union 2.3 2.8 2.8 4.2 3.6 3.1 1.9 1.2 -0.3 2.8 2.5 1.7 2.6 2.9 2.8 3.5 1.6 0.9 1.9 2.7
Mean EMU-12 2.5 2.8 2.9 4.8 5.0 3.6 2.4 1.2 -0.1 2.9 3.1 2.7 4.3 4.3 4.1 4.9 1.9 1.3 2.3 3.2
Standard deviation EMU-12 0.5 2.5 2.3 1.7 1.8 2.4 3.4 1.6 1.9 1.2 2.3 2.0 2.8 2.1 2.4 2.7 1.6 1.2 0.8 0.8
Variation coefficient EMU-12 0.2 0.9 0.8 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.4 1.3 -16.7 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.4 0.2
Maximum spread EMU-12 2.0 10.4 8.6 5.8 6.9 8.5 14.9 6.7 6.2 4.8 8.7 7.0 9.4 6.8 9.3 8.6 5.4 3.5 2.4 2.1
Source: OECD. 2002. Economic Outlook 72.
Table 35: Real GDP EMU-12                                                                                           
percentage change from previous period
Note: The adoption of new national account systems, SNA93 or ESA95, has been proceeding at an uneven pace among OECD member countries, both with respect to variables and the time period covered. As a consequence, there are breaks in many national 







     
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002* 2003* 2004*
BEL 1.8 2.4 4.6 3.6 3 1.8 1.3 -0.7 3.3 2.3 0.8 3.9 2.1 3.2 3.7 0.8 0.7 2.1 2.8
FRA 2.3 2.5 4.2 4.3 2.6 1 1.3 -0.9 1.9 1.8 1.1 1.9 3.5 3.2 4.2 1.8 1 1.9 2.9
GER 2.4 1.5 3.7 3.9 5.7 5.1 2.2 -1.1 2.3 1.7 0.8 1.4 2 2 2.9 0.6 0.4 1.5 2.5
NED 2.8 1.4 2.6 4.7 4.1 2.3 2 0.8 3.2 2.3 3 3.8 4.3 4 3.3 1.3 0.1 1.6 2.6
Lux 10 4 8.5 9.8 5.3 8.6 1.8 4.2 3.8 1.3 3.7 7.7 7.5 6 8.9 1 0.8 2.5 4.5
Mean EMU-5 3.9 2.4 4.7 5.3 4.1 3.8 1.7 0.5 2.9 1.9 1.9 3.7 3.9 3.7 4.6 1.1 0.6 1.9 3.1
Standard deviation EMU-5 3.5 1.0 2.2 2.6 1.4 3.1 0.4 2.2 0.8 0.4 1.4 2.5 2.2 1.5 2.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.8
Variation of correlation EMU-5 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.2 4.8 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.3
Max spread EMU-5 8.2 2.6 5.9 6.2 3.1 7.6 0.9 5.3 1.9 1.0 2.9 6.3 5.5 4.0 6.0 1.2 0.9 1.0 2.0
Max spread EMU-4 1.0 1.1 2.0 1.1 3.1 4.1 0.9 1.9 1.4 0.6 2.2 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.3 1.2 0.9 0.6 0.4
Euro-Area 2.4 2.5 4.1 4 3.6 2.5 1.4 -0.8 2.3 2.2 1.4 2.3 2.9 2.8 3.6 1.5 0.8 1.8 2.7
EU 2.8 2.8 4.2 3.6 3.1 1.9 1.2 -0.3 2.8 2.5 1.7 2.6 2.9 2.8 3.5 1.6 0.9 1.9 2.7
EMU-4: without Luxembourg.
Source: OECD. 2002. Economic Outlook 72 and own calculations.
Table 37: Real GDP EMU-5                                                                                       
percentage change from previous period
Estimates and projections
Table 38: Consumer prices indices EMU-5
Percentage change from previous period
Average
1975-85 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001* 2002* 2003*
BEL 6.7     1.3   1.6   1.2   3.1   3.4   3.9   2.2   2.5   2.4   1.3   1.8   1.5   0.9   1.1   2.7   2.4   1.6   1.4  
FRA 10.1     2.5   3.3   2.7   3.5   3.6   3.4   2.4   2.2   1.7   1.8   2.1   1.3   0.7   0.6   1.8   1.8   1.9   1.8  
GER 3.9     -0.1   0.2   1.3   2.8   2.7   4.0   5.1   4.4   2.8   1.7   1.2   1.5   0.6   0.6   2.1   2.4   1.6   1.4  
Lux 6.7     0.3   -0.1   1.4   3.4   3.3   3.1   3.2   3.6   2.2   1.9   1.2   1.4   1.0   1.0   3.8   2.4   2.1   1.7  
NED 5.1     0.1   -0.7   0.7   1.1   2.5   3.1   2.8   1.7   2.2   1.6   1.4   1.9   1.8   2.0   2.3   5.1   4.0   2.7  
Euro area 7.3     2.5   2.6   2.7   3.8   5.8   4.3   3.8   3.4   2.8   2.6   2.3   1.7   1.2   1.1   2.4   2.5   2.4   2.2  
Mean EMU-5 6.49 0.82 0.87 1.46 2.77 3.08 3.51 3.14 2.87 2.24 1.66 1.53 1.51 0.98 1.08 2.54 2.83 2.25 1.80
Standard deviation EMU-5 2.31 1.11 1.58 0.74 0.98 0.48 0.42 1.14 1.12 0.38 0.25 0.39 0.22 0.47 0.59 0.76 1.31 1.00 0.56
Variation coefficient EMU-5 0.36 1.36 1.82 0.51 0.35 0.16 0.12 0.36 0.39 0.17 0.15 0.26 0.14 0.48 0.55 0.30 0.46 0.45 0.31
Source: OECD. 2002. Economic Outlook 72.
Estimates and projections
a
bc